“Potential Innocence”: Making the Most
of a Bleak Environment for Public
Support of Indigent Defense by Mosteller, Robert P.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 2 Article 16
Spring 3-1-2013
“Potential Innocence”: Making the Most of a Bleak
Environment for Public Support of Indigent
Defense
Robert P. Mosteller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons
This Panel 4: The Future of the Right to Counsel is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington &
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert P. Mosteller, “Potential Innocence”: Making the Most of a Bleak Environment for Public Support




“Potential Innocence”: Making the Most 
of a Bleak Environment for Public 
Support of Indigent Defense 
Robert P. Mosteller∗ 
Table of Contents 
 I. The Future of the Right to Counsel .............................. 1346 
 II. The Need for Excellent Lawyers to Represent  
  the Truly Innocent Armed Only with Reasonable  
  Doubt, Which Is Perceived Objectively as  
  “Potential Innocence”..................................................... 1350 
 III. Defenders Think They Know Who Is Guilty, and  
  They Do Much of the Time, but Not Necessarily  
  When It Matters Most ................................................... 1352 
 IV. The Theoretically Easy Answer of Good Lawyers  
  for All ............................................................................. 1354 
 V. The Harsh Present Reality Based in Fiscal and  
  Empathy Limitations .................................................... 1355 
 VI. Those Who Care About Innocence Should Stick  
  Together: The Argument that Public Defenders  
  Protect Some of the Innocent May Be Inadequate,  
  but It Is the Best Argument Available, and It  
  Has the Benefit of Being True ....................................... 1359 
  A. Help Those Innocent Defendants We Can  
   with Arguments for Innocence ................................ 1359 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean 
for Academic Affairs, University of North Carolina School of Law. I wish to 
thank the participants in the Symposium, Gideon at 50: Reassessing the Right 
to Counsel, for a thought-provoking exchange of ideas on this exciting topic and 
the wonderful support of the Washington and Lee University School of Law.  
1346 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1345 (2013) 
  B. Assist the Innocent with Organizational  
   and Procedural Mechanisms that Engender  
   Neutrality in Investigation and Charging  
   and Augment Reliability ......................................... 1360 
  C. Open up the Information: Full Open-File  
   Discovery ................................................................. 1360 
 VII. Support Reforms that Reduce the Impact of  
  Inadequate Counsel but Not Those that Diminish  
  the Command for Excellent Counsel ............................. 1361 
 VIII. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1362 
I. The Future of the Right to Counsel 
An examination of Gideon v. Wainwright1 after fifty years 
involves both its past failures and accomplishments and its 
future impact. Gideon’s legacy is enormously positive with the 
expansion of rights to so many indigent defendants in need of 
representation against criminal charges that could deny them life 
and liberty, but its inadequacies in fulfilling its full promise are 
glaring as well. These competing themes are reflected in many 
articles that are part of this symposium.2 I choose to focus 
principally on its future, which, of course, will likely be guided by 
its past. 
                                                                                                     
 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding 
Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290–91 (2013) 
(proposing a number of measures to reduce the range of cases covered by Gideon 
with the purpose of preserving its core); Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About 
Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1309, 1335–44 (2013) (suggesting, inter alia, exploration of nonlawyer 
alternatives for indigent representation); Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: 
Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 883, 916–24 (2013) (suggesting and critiquing a number of approaches 
both from the perspective of the liberal, conservative, and pragmatic agenda); 
Abbe Smith, Gideon Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass 
Incarceration, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1390–91 (2013) (arguing to address 
the problem of limited defense services by reducing overcriminalization and 
reducing our massive incarceration rate). 
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In this period of reflection on Gideon, I have had the 
opportunity to participate in three conferences examining this 
landmark decision. The first, which was held early in 2010,3 
recognized the difficulties in fulfilling Gideon’s promise of 
effective assistance to all those entitled to an attorney under the 
Sixth Amendment, but it differed from the latter two occurring in 
2012 in its degree of (perhaps unrealistic) optimism. The latter 
two, including the wonderful symposium at Washington and Lee 
University School of Law,4 exhibit their share of optimism, but 
they contain many more voices suggesting reexamination of the 
dimensions of Gideon and its costs and suggesting alternatives to 
traditional attorney representation.  
For me, the obvious and sufficient explanation for the 
difference in focus is twofold. The first is the recognition of the 
magnitude of the economic downturn that was not yet fully 
appreciated in 2009. The second is the intervening mid-term 
election in 2010, which changed the conversation and the political 
landscape at the national, state, and local levels with respect to 
resources available for public purposes. While I wish we could 
address this new reality with traditional responses, I doubt that 
is possible and therefore applaud the new voices and proposals. 
They give us the chance to remake the system of representation 
of those charged with crime for the better and provide additional 
tools to meet the challenges of a much more difficult 
environment. 
In considering new critiques and proposals, however, I 
suggest limitations both on the criticism of Gideon and on the 
types of proposals that should be entertained. Gideon can hardly 
be criticized because it has led to excessive spending on unneeded 
services. I have not seen the evidence that either excessive 
spending has occurred or that defense services are unneeded, 
particularly in the modern world of growing complexity in 
criminal litigation. While some government programs may be 
                                                                                                     
 3. This earlier symposium was titled Broke and Broken: Can We Fix Our 
State Indigent Defense System? It was held at the University of Missouri School 
of Law in Columbia, Missouri on February 26, 2010. 
 4. The other more recent symposium concerned the Sixth Amendment, 
including the right to counsel, and was held at Texas Tech University School of 
Law on March 30, 2012. 
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criticized as fostering lavish expenditures and bloated 
bureaucracy, those are not criticisms of indigent defense. Instead, 
compensation for defenders is recognized as low and often 
inadequate, and work requirements are typically excessive.5 The 
services are provided to those whom the government has charged 
with a crime in the limited area where their liberty may be 
denied.6 These legal services are provided only to those 
determined to be unable to afford their own lawyer under 
standards of indigency that are generally very demanding.7  
Those who support Gideon’s promise should be willing to 
embrace reform solutions that provide services in a more cost 
efficient way. Doctrinal retrenchments on what may be 
considered marginal elements of Gideon’s requirements,8 
however, should be supported only if such reductions come with 
guarantees of improvements elsewhere. I do not believe that 
monetary savings resulting from reductions in the scope of 
Gideon offered by its supporters will produce compensating 
increases to services within the core by heretofore resistant 
public officials.  
I believe that such quid pro quo exchanges are not available. 
First, I doubt that there is any realistic mechanism for 
negotiation. The process of change requires two steps: doctrinal 
                                                                                                     
 5. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the 
Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Outcomes, 122 YALE L. 
J. 154, 162–64 (2012) (presenting a study documenting the low pay received for 
demanding work of Philadelphia-based lawyers providing indigent defense). 
 6. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (limiting right to 
counsel cases where the defendant is imprisoned and excluding cases when the 
defendant is only fined); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) 
(interpreting Scott to apply to cases where defendant is sentenced to 
imprisonment and the sentence is suspended and placed on probation because 
imprisonment is the result of the sentence if the probation is revoked).  
 7. See John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How 
States Use the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of their Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1176 (2013) 
(describing the various ways indigency is defined and demonstrating the 
extreme level of poverty generally required to qualify for appointed counsel 
without some level of contribution from the accused).  
 8. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 1290 (arguing that the extension to cases 
carrying no immediate incarceration but only a probationary sentence that may 
result in incarceration upon violation of probation was a step too far and should 
be eliminated as part of a bargain to shrink Gideon’s scope to preserve its core). 
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change by the United States Supreme Court and a change in 
funding. Unless the Supreme Court undertakes what it has not 
done before, it will not link doctrinal change to funding. Indeed, I 
have difficulty imagining a mechanism that would accomplish 
this purpose and do not believe past cases provide any models. As 
a result, the reduction in rights at the doctrinal level must 
happen first and cannot be linked to the political realities that 
must occur at multiple levels throughout the state indigent 
defense systems.9 Next, I believe there is no obvious level of 
reductions that would be considered sufficient to justify the 
expenditure of scarce public resources by those states and 
localities that now systemically underfund Gideon.  
Finally, I suggest that any reforms recognize the human and 
institutional elements of meaningful public defense employment. 
Many law students and lawyers who enter that work today do so 
because they recognize its importance. They, however, are not 
unrealistic about uncertainty and the need to prepare for other 
potential careers. If indigent defendants are to be given what I 
believe is due under the Sixth Amendment—the prospect of 
representation at the quality level of those able to afford their 
own attorney—then lawyers who enter indigent defense must be 
first rate. These lawyers may be economically trained, but for 
reasons of self-interest in an uncertain world, they cannot be on 
an isolated track that leads only to a limited practice option in 
the underpaid world of indigent defense.10 
                                                                                                     
 9. The inadequacies of Gideon are felt at the state, rather than the 
federal, level. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 894 (introducing the “failure” of 
Gideon to provide for indigent defense). An often-missed reality of state criminal 
justice operations and reforms is that those systems are generally disorganized 
rather than highly hierarchical. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Sixth Amendment 
Rights to Fairness: The Touchstones of Effectiveness and Pragmatism, 45 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“[T]he vast majority of serious criminal prosecutions 
are handled in the much more chaotic and underfunded state courts.”). 
 10. I applaud the efforts of Professor Don Dripps in looking at fundamental 
reform in a broad, conceptual way and trying to cure the inadequacies of Gideon 
by limiting the supply of cases that need to be handled or the supply of lawyers 
and resources to handle them. One potential mechanism he suggests is to make 
the credential to provide defense services more readily available by developing a 
different track in legal education. See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 129–30 (2013) (arguing that a separate track in legal 
education would both address issues in the cost of obtaining a law degree and 
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II. The Need for Excellent Lawyers to Represent the Truly 
Innocent Armed Only with Reasonable Doubt, Which Is 
Perceived Objectively as “Potential Innocence” 
I spent seven eventful years at the Public Defender Service 
for the District of Columbia (PDS). I have written about a set of 
cases I handled there that raised difficult factual issues about 
guilt and innocence.11 I am a firm believer in two propositions 
regarding the role of quality indigent defense in protecting the 
innocent. First, many truly innocent defendants are hidden 
among reasonable doubt cases. A substantial percentage of these 
truly innocent defendants have no real prospects of conclusively 
proving their innocence on the model of DNA exonerations, which 
is often considered the standard for “actual innocence.”12 Second, 
                                                                                                     
fulfill a need for indigent representation). That effort causes me considerable 
concern because it diminishes the excellence, the standing, and the career 
options of those trained in a more economical way for the specific task of 
criminal representation. I suggest that the problems associated with this 
particular proposal would be insuperable. 
 11. See Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for 
Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 931, 954–57 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent] 
(providing experiences representing apparently typical clients shown in some 
instances by chance events to be factually innocent and in others to have 
concrete but unknowable prospects for innocence); Robert P. Mosteller, Why 
Defense Counsel Cannot, but Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1, 1–6 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, Caring About Innocence] (arguing that 
although defense counsels’ feelings about the guilt or innocence of their clients 
are irrelevant or even dangerous to the quality of representation they deliver, 
such concerns, particularly about innocence, nonetheless exist). 
 12. The concept of actual innocence plays a key role in the terminology of 
the innocence movement. See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 71 
(2000) (providing the title for a major book describing important early successes 
in the innocence movement). One influence of the high standard of proof 
associated with this term is exemplified by its use in connection with the 
emergence of a substantive constitutional claim of habeas corpus sufficient to 
bar execution, as seen in Herrera v. Collins. See 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (“[I]n a 
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after 
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and warrant 
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a 
claim . . . .”). More generally, Brandon Garrett states: 
The word “innocence” is used casually in the media and by lawyers, 
convicts, scholars, and courts. I define the innocent as those who did 
not commit the charged crime. Even though they know they are 
actually innocent, many lack the evidence to prove their innocence to 
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the best prospect for protecting these innocent defendants is to 
provide them with excellent legal assistance. 
I chose the term “potential innocence” for my title to be an 
accurate descriptive term that was not tailored to capture the 
public’s imagination, which I believe is an unfortunate reality of 
this type of innocence. On the other hand, I mean to convey by 
the term that truly innocent defendants are found among 
reasonable doubt cases and that these potentially innocent 
defendants when well represented are not acquitted because of 
legal technicalities. Many are just as truly innocent as defendants 
exonerated by DNA in every sense but one: their innocence 
cannot be demonstrated definitively.  
The types of cases I am contemplating here may be difficult 
to visualize in the abstract. To help make these cases more 
concrete, I have described examples from cases I handled in my 
practice at PDS,13 but I need not recite those here. Instead, the 
Gideon case itself provides a helpful example.14 And the work of 
Gideon’s attorney, W. Fred Turner, at the retrial after remand 
from the United States Supreme Court, shows the importance of 
                                                                                                     
others, making it difficult to distinguish them from the convicts and 
prisoners who falsely claim innocence.  
Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1645–46 (2008) 
(citation omitted). Although not always employed consistently, I find that the 
term actual innocence is generally used—and I use it in this Article—to describe 
those cases that Professor Garrett would categorize in his study as “substantial 
claims” of innocence. See id. at 1647–49 (discussing substantial claims of 
innocence). These cases are epitomized by “complete exonerations,” in which 
evidence of innocence that is highly dispositive of identity exculpates the 
defendant, employing DNA or other technology-based proof such as video 
evidence. See id. (discussing substantial claims of innocence); see also Emily 
Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085–86 (2011) (“The 
media and legal scholars often use the terms ‘actually innocent’ and ‘factually 
innocent’ to describe a person who had nothing to do with a crime: he is not 
actually the person who committed the crime; the facts show that somebody else 
did it.”). 
 13. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 11, at 938–59 
(describing the difficulty of separating those who may be innocent but have only 
strong arguments of reasonable doubt from those who are innocent). 
 14. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) (describing the 
facts of the case and the events and proceedings that led to the landmark 
Supreme Court decision). 
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good lawyering in protecting that potential innocence. Turner’s 
work is ably described by Professor Abbe Smith.15 
As I read the facts of Gideon’s case, I cannot conclude he is 
innocent because of the absence of any firm exculpatory 
evidence and the large number of coins he had in his pockets, 
which seems to match the missing proceeds of the burglarized 
pool hall.16 Even more absolutely, I cannot put him in the 
category of those who would in today’s nomenclature be 
considered actually innocent.17 However, he may well have been 
innocent—not under some legal technicality—but truly 
innocent. The key problem is that we do not know, and along 
with many other cases in this category today, we can never 
know for certain because unchallengeable evidence of innocence 
does not exist. Gideon’s case illustrates the uncertainties we 
face in determining innocence, and the work of his attorney 
reflects the best that most defense attorneys can ever do to 
protect the truly innocent. Such attorneys are the difference 
between conviction and acquittal for defendants who have 
potential, sometimes strong potential, for being truly innocent. 
III. Defenders Think They Know Who Is Guilty, and They Do 
Much of the Time, but Not Necessarily When It Matters Most 
In my writing, I noted that the job of a public defender is not 
to concentrate on whether a client is innocent or guilty.18 Indeed, 
it is almost antithetical to that concern in that public defenders’ 
work must presume the worth of each client and the value of 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1375, 1378–79 (recounting Turner’s 
effective defense work in the areas of jury selection and cross-examination of the 
key prosecution witness). 
 16. See LEWIS, supra note 14, at 232–36 (describing the large amount of 
change in Gideon’s pockets and its impact as circumstantial proof that he 
burglarized the pool hall because a cigarette machine and the juke box had been 
broken into and coins taken). 
 17. See cases and materials cited supra note 12 and accompanying text 
(discussing the concept of actual innocence). 
 18. See Mosteller, Caring About Innocence, supra note 11, at 1–6 (noting 
that concentrating on the question of the accused client’s guilt has negative 
ethical consequences). 
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mounting at the minimum a due process battle against the 
prosecution. Public defenders with adequate resources seek to 
provide excellent representation to all.19  
My job as a public defender was to help the people I met in 
lockup regardless of who they were or whether they were 
innocent or guilty. I noted, however, that the perception a client 
might well be innocent had an impact on me (and I assume other 
defenders) even though I knew it should not.20 
I felt a kinship in my perspective as a public defender to the 
attitude exhibited by Tommy Lee Jones in The Fugitive when he 
responded to Harrison Ford’s claim that he was innocent with the 
memorable line, “I don’t care.”21 Just as Deputy Marshal Sam 
Gerad, played by Jones, could not function in his professional role 
if he made decisions based on his personal beliefs about the guilt 
or innocence of fugitives, defenders cannot survive in the job if 
they assume they defend only the innocent. Thoughts 
nevertheless turn in that direction. 
It is quite difficult in many cases to have confidence in the 
difference between the innocent, the likely innocent, the possibly 
innocent, and the probably guilty. Of course, there are cases 
where guilt is almost certainly established, but my experience is 
that guilt was rarely established for defense counsel on the basis 
of the client’s confidential admission. Rather, it was established 
on the basis of the evidence and information I encountered 
through discovery and investigation. Conceptually, however, 
there are two basic groups of cases: Group 1, the innocent (with 
varying degrees of certainty) and Group 2, the guilty (also with 
varying degrees of certainty). Group 2 is the much larger of the 
two, and it clearly should be since the police and prosecutors have 
the ability to investigate and prosecute cases on the basis of the 
apparent strength of the proof. 
                                                                                                     
 19. See id. at 5–8 (describing the attitude of defense attorneys as not caring 
about innocence because professionally and practically they cannot care and do 
the lawyering tasks entailed effectively). 
 20. See id. at 13–22 (examining the handling of innocent clients’ cases). 
 21. THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993). 
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IV. The Theoretically Easy Answer of Good Lawyers for All 
One solution that avoids difficult problems of choice among 
defendants is to provide excellent legal services to all.22 That 
approach would help Group 1 establish their innocence, and it 
would provide important benefits to Group 2 in addition to the 
possibility of an acquittal. Proving an effective defense is clearly 
indicated for both groups under the specific guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment and the fundamental concepts of due process 
and equal protection that formed the constitutional foundations 
of Gideon.23 Legal doctrine clearly provides broad support for full 
representation of both groups; the only impediments, which are 
huge, are developing practical support to fund broad, effective 
representation, and to find the means within our available public 
resources to do so. 
I personally favor this broad approach and believe that 
innocence protection broadly conceived can and should be part of 
the supporting basis for expanded funding.24 My contention is 
that uncertainty about innocence and the difficulty of a defender 
confidently determining each defendant’s probable level of 
innocence or guilt strongly counsel for treating all clients as 
worthy of a quality defense, lest some who are innocent are 
wrongfully and needlessly convicted. 
                                                                                                     
 22. I recognize that PDS was unusually well resourced. As a result, it in 
fact permitted lawyers to provide, not the type of representation the wealthy can 
afford, but effective counsel to all its clients, which I believe is generally true for 
federal public defenders offices. 
 23. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (locating the 
right within the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment with justification 
based on fundamental principles of due process supplemented by the demands 
of equal justice before the law). 
 24. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 11, at 937, 985–87 
(describing a public role of innocent protection in representing those with 
reasonable doubt cases and its potential to provide support for adequate funding 
of indigent defense). 
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V. The Harsh Present Reality Based in Fiscal and Empathy 
Limitations 
The arguments set out immediately above for robust 
implementation of Gideon’s promise are, I believe, well taken and 
should be continued. Economic and political events, however, that 
have moved at a rapid pace over the past few years as the impact 
of the great recession has settled upon us have altered, in my 
judgment, the likelihood of success in developing change in 
support for indigent defense using general innocence arguments. 
We have entered a period where public resources are quite scarce 
and are likely to remain scarce for the foreseeable future, and 
where a substantial portion of the public expresses a declining 
interest in government providing services generally and are 
arguably particularly resistant to providing services to those at 
the margins of society.25 Those charged with crime, especially 
those who have substantial criminal records, likely epitomize the 
groups for whom concern is lacking.26 
I will note two suggestive pieces of information indicating the 
magnitude of the change in state financing status. First, the 
                                                                                                     
 25. Conservatives complain frequently that the government takes income 
from those who work and are generating jobs to provide benefits to what is most 
provocatively termed the “moocher class”—terminology used by syndicated talk 
show host Neal Boortz. See Neal Boortz on the Moocher Class, REAL CLEAR 
POLITICS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2010/10/14/neal_ 
boortz_on_the_moocher_class.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the 
moocher class as “people who are ‘perfectly content to live at the expense of 
others’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also AYN RAND, 
THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 32 (1964). 
Parasites, moochers, looters, brutes and thugs can be of no value to a 
human being—nor can he gain any benefit from living in a society 
geared to their needs, demands and protection, a society that treats 
him as a sacrificial animal and penalizes him for his virtues in order 
to reward them for their vices, which means: a society based on the 
ethics of altruism. 
Id. 
 26. On the other hand, even conservative state politicians such as Governor 
Rick Snyder of Michigan recognize that indigent defense is an obligation of 
government. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2011-12 (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/mi_executiveorderno2011-12_10132011.pdf 
(noting the state’s interest in effective defense for indigents and the need for 
adequate funding in signing an executive order establishing the Indigent 
Defense Commission). 
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State Budget Crisis Task Force issued a report in July 2012 
stating that the fiscal crisis for the states will continue for a long 
period after the economy revives.27 This is because of expected 
increasing health care costs, a pattern of underfunded pensions, 
generally disregarded infrastructure needs, and eroding 
revenues, a part of which will be expected federal budget cuts.28 
Second, a number of states cut services, such as school funding 
with rising class sizes, when revenues declined substantially 
during the worst of the recession and have chosen not to restore 
services to their earlier level even as revenues have rebounded.29 
This response may just be prudence in waiting to see if economic 
improvements continue, but the initial decision is consistent with 
an effort to decrease the level of services by holding them at 
levels prompted by the recessionary budget crisis.30 
One plausible view of the next decade is that spending by 
state and local governments for all services will not only not 
increase, but may well decline. We could see a situation in which 
citizens are expecting and receiving less in a broad range of 
public services. Spending for indigent defense in this 
environment will be hard pressed to hold its own, and increases 
will be unrealistic.  
The expectation of reduced federal discretionary spending for 
a sustained period of time adds to the bleak picture of hope for 
substantial increased government outlays for indigent defense. In 
                                                                                                     
 27. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, FULL REPORT 6, 50 (July 31, 
2012), http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-
State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf (stating that states will continue to 
suffer economically after the recession partly because the great share of their 
tax bases are highly economically sensitive); Mary Williams Walsh & Michael 
Cooper, Gloomy Forecast for States, Even if Economy Rebounds, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2012, at A1 (discussing the report). 
 28. Walsh & Cooper, supra note 27; see also STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK 
FORCE, supra note 27, at 2–3. 
 29. See Jim Siegel, Ohio’s Rainy-Day Fund Goes from 89 Cents to $482 
Million, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 4, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/ 
stories/local/2012/07/04/surplus-goes-from-89-cents-to-482-million.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (using Ohio, which saw a surplus of $235 million and refused to 
spend it, as an example) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. Rahm Emanuel stated in November 2008, “Never let a serious crisis go 
to waste. What I mean by that is it’s an opportunity to do things you couldn’t do 
before.” A Forty-Year Wish List, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at A14. 
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my judgment, one of the most promising recent proposals to 
improve the quality of indigent services was made by Professor 
Norm Lefstein.31 A central component of his proposal is a new 
federal center for defense services and the availability of federal 
funding to support model programs.32 Without federal leadership 
and the support of federal funding, which are intertwined and are 
now quite problematic both in the near term and the likely long 
term, significant reforms are far less likely to occur. 
These changes in the environment have caused me to 
recalibrate my thinking on how to approach innocence protection 
and support of indigent defense. Realism in a likely harsh form 
counsels a less optimistic view of what arguments will win 
funding support. I now expect that a concern with innocence may 
not have enough power figuratively to move the “funding needle” 
except when it is innocence in the clearest sense. The innocence 
movement’s standard of actual innocence, which I believe is 
underinclusive, may well be the only form of innocence that has 
significance to the public and therefore to legislators. 
One sub-point that I sense is likely of relevance is that unless 
the person is relatively uninvolved in crime or the crime where 
innocence is shown is very serious (e.g., homicide) and far beyond 
the level of the accused’s previous criminal involvement, being 
innocent of the particular crime may not matter very much to the 
public.33 I have noted that I believe many of those who are not 
demonstrably innocent, but innocent in fact, may have the type of 
background in crime that suggests their involvement in the 
particular crime under investigation.34 A person picked from a 
photo array assembled by the police for display to an armed 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from 
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 928–29 (2004) 
(describing a proposal that depends on federal funding and the creation of a 
federal center for defense services). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Mosteller, Caring About Innocence, supra note 11, at 41–43 
(relating the story of Lee Wayne Hunt, who was convicted solely on the basis of 
informant testimony); see also D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An 
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780–82 (2007) (discussing some elements of a potential 
typology). 
 34. Mosteller, Caring About Innocence, supra note 11, at 41–43. 
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robbery victim, for example, may have committed other similar 
robberies but not be guilty of the particular robbery.35 Or she may 
be the companion of a drug dealer who herself has prior 
involvement with the use and sale of drugs but may not have 
been involved in the specific drug deal at issue in the 
prosecution.36 If it ever was enough to garner public support, 
innocence of the precise crime charged, but not general innocence, 
may no longer be enough to justify increased funding for indigent 
defense.37 
In particular cases, and for those who know the individual 
charged and the local facts, all possibilities of potential innocence 
will no doubt continue to matter. Occasionally, when a case with 
compelling facts attracts attention or when it involves salient 
stereotypes, good lawyering, including defense work, is 
appreciated.38 Innocence, the possibility of innocence, due process 
for the guilty, and providing assistance to fellow citizens dealing 
with an unforgiving governmental structure should all matter as 
values served by the system that Gideon spawned. A high 
percentage of the work of those who defend the indigents, 
however, aids clients who are typically guilty, even if not culpable 
in the charged crime, or who are clearly guilty but are only 
                                                                                                     
 35. See id. at 23–26 (describing a former client whose case fit this pattern). 
 36. See United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1035–37 (4th Cir. 
1992) (describing the fact pattern of a female companion of a clearly guilty male 
defendant in which her guilt was uncertain as to the specific drug distribution 
scheme prosecuted, but who was obviously knowledgeable about drug sales 
generally). 
 37. To my eye, Clarence Gideon may well be an exception to my general 
sense that the potential for innocence by one who has a substantial record and 
therefore might be considered figuratively one of the “usual suspects” cannot 
capture the public imagination. As his case is generally described, particularly 
when Gideon’s picture accompanies that description, his case seems an outrage 
and innocence is almost beside the point. I suspect my reaction may be based on 
what seems to be a very long sentence for a fragile and elderly man who is 
apparently harmless, has endured a substantial imprisonment already, and is 
noble in his demand for fair treatment. Switch a few of those stereotypes to the 
modern day young inter-city defendant convicted of drug trafficking, and I 
suspect the reaction begins to change markedly. 
 38. For example, both Trayvon Martin, the decedent, and George 
Zimmerman, the defendant, have personal characteristics and represent 
political and societal positions that could make substantial elements of the 
public supportive of good lawyering for their positions. 
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insisting on their rights to due process. For most defendants, the 
public likely sees excellent defense work as taking advantage of 
procedural protections considered “legal technicalities.”39 
VI. Those Who Care About Innocence Should Stick Together: The 
Argument that Public Defenders Protect Some of the Innocent May 
Be Inadequate, but It Is the Best Argument Available, and It Has 
the Benefit of Being True 
Despite its relative weaknesses in the current environment, 
innocence protection is likely the best available option to develop 
public support for indigent defense. The innocence movement’s 
standard of almost absolute proof, however, effectively limits its 
support of Gideon’s command to a small subset of defendants. On 
the other hand, despite being narrowly focused, the innocence 
movement has been a strong enabling force for important 
procedural protections for those charged with crime.  
A. Help Those Innocent Defendants We Can with Arguments for 
Innocence 
Given the difficulty of raising support for lawyers for the 
indigent in general, second best solutions may be in order. Some 
of these that tend to separate the innocent from the guilty may be 
the most effective responses for those who are truly innocent, 
with the paths of advocacy diverging based on the clarity and 
availability of the proof.40 For example, greater access to DNA 
testing can help the innocent in cases where DNA trace evidence 
is definitive. But emphasis on DNA can suggest that those 
                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of 
Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 695 n.2 (2006) (presenting one A.B.A. 
sponsored poll in which 73% of respondent consumers believed that “lawyers 
spend too much time finding technicalities to get criminals released” (citation 
omitted)). 
 40. See Mosteller, supra note 9, at 12 (arguing that different conceptions of 
fairness can lead to support for all defendants or only to defendants who are 
likely innocent, and that reforms that focus on the latter may have the effect of 
reducing support for broader measures). 
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without proof of exoneration are not only not innocent, but are 
likely guilty. Proof of the type offered by DNA tends to give the 
public false hope of certainty regarding both innocence and—
where it is not established—guilt. 
B. Assist the Innocent with Organizational and Procedural 
Mechanisms that Engender Neutrality in Investigation and 
Charging and Augment Reliability 
Another approach is to provide greater neutrality to 
investigating agencies and prosecutors. This approach could help 
both the clearly guilty and those who are stereotyped as guilty by 
investigators caught up in the competitive process of ferreting out 
crime. But it would not help those who are implicated by a 
thorough, neutral investigation and instead need a vigorous 
challenge to the government’s case in order to give effect to 
potential reasonable doubts. 
C. Open up the Information: Full Open-File Discovery 
The one reform that I believe has the greatest potential to 
aid indigent defense across the board is full, open-file discovery. 
Such broad discovery makes defending cases cheaper; it aids 
defense counsel with limited investigative resources; and it can 
unearth the truth. Realistically, it can also aid the clearly guilty 
by permitting fabrication of a defense or witness tampering. 
Broad discovery’s potential to aid the guilty is the major basis on 
which full, open-file discovery is often resisted, and it is hardly 
the basis on which any supporter can argue for an extension of 
disclosure. With sufficient protections and reciprocity of discovery 
obligations for the defense, however, I believe its value is 
undeniable and helps protect many of the same interests upon 
which Gideon rests. 
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VII. Support Reforms that Reduce the Impact of Inadequate 
Counsel but Not Those that Diminish the Command for 
Excellent Counsel 
In the near future, and perhaps in the long run, there is little 
prospect of substantially improving the level of funding for 
indigent services. That point, however, does not justify reducing 
the demand for excellence. That demand is fulfilled in some 
situations, such as in federal court, and it should not be 
diminished. Moreover, when enforced through ineffective 
assistance claims, it provides relief for potentially innocent 
defendants since the standard for reversal effectively requires a 
showing of a plausible prospect of innocence.41 I have not seen a 
persuasive argument for how diminishing the requirement will 
result in any guarantee for greater provision of resources. 
My proposals for reform, which include administrative 
changes to make the prosecution function and the investigative 
and forensic process more neutral, and for open-file discovery, 
have a different impact than diminishing the demand for 
excellent representation or reducing the scope of the right to 
counsel. Instead, they supplement or provide benefits to the 
efforts of defense counsel. I suggest reforms of that nature are to 
be advanced, particularly those that do not require extensive 
monetary outlays to be effective.42  
                                                                                                     
 41. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (requiring that 
the defendant demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result would have been different”). 
 42. See Mosteller, supra note 9, at 15–16 (emphasizing the importance of 
fostering reforms, even if ostensibly based on constitutional commands, which 
entail limited costs because of the unlikelihood that they will be fully 
implemented in a criminal justice system faced with woefully inadequate 
resources). The fact that substantial expenditures are not required does not 
suggest these reforms will be easily accomplished politically or organizationally. 
I believe, however, that in the present environment, requirements of substantial 
financial outlays make the proposal not only ultimately difficult to accomplish, 
but also likely to be recognized as a nonstarter that therefore has no chance of 
success. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
I believe robust Sixth Amendment protections, including 
assisting individuals in navigating the criminal justice system, 
are worthy arguments to support indigent defense. But I am 
becoming convinced they will not prevail with the public in the 
current economic and political environment. Innocence protection 
is the only available option to develop public support, but I 
believe the innocence movement’s standard of almost absolute 
proof makes using innocence as a motivating factor very difficult 
for all but a small subset of defendants who can demonstrate 
innocence or can connect with the public on a personal level. 
These are not the bases for broad support for indigent defense. 
Unfortunately, the innocence argument that can prevail is likely 
not figuratively a tide powerful enough to lift all boats. 
My sense of hope and reality collide. Some levels of hope 
must realistically be abandoned. Those who support Gideon are 
likely unable to convince the public of the value of broad support 
for indigent defense in that the values it protects are either not 
considered worthy at all or are considered insufficiently 
important when weighed against other unmet public needs. 
Actual innocence is likely the only realistically available 
argument to further Gideon, but its power is only sufficient to 
carry the day for a limited group of cases.  
Innocence concerns, however, provide a modicum of leverage 
for due process arguments in general and for support for a 
substantial right to counsel in particular. The arguments for 
innocence among the group I highlight—the potentially innocent 
who are only able to show degrees of doubt regarding their guilt—
are likely inadequate in their own right. Nevertheless, they are 
important to prevent isolation of the effective innocence 
argument to the narrow group of those defendants demonstrated 
to be actually innocent, which could even further disadvantage all 
others charged with crime. 
